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SUMMARY
Although the end of the Cold War freed
India-U.S. relations from the constraints of
global bipolarity, New Delhi-Washington
relations continued for a decade to be affected
by the burden of history, most notably the
longstanding India-Pakistan rivalry. Recent
years, however, have witnessed a sea change
in bilateral relations, with more positive inter-
actions becoming the norm. India’s swift
offer of full support for U.S.-led anti-terrorism
operations after September 2001 is widely
viewed as reflective of such change.
Continuing U.S. concern in South Asia
focuses especially on the historic and ongoing
tensions between nuclear-armed India and
Pakistan, tensions rooted in unfinished busi-
ness from the 1947 Partition, and competing
claims to the former princely state of Kashmir.
The United States also seeks to prevent the
regional proliferation of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles. Both India and Pakistan
have so far resisted U.S. and international
pressure to sign the major international
nonproliferation treaties.
In May 1998, India conducted a series of
unannounced nuclear tests that evoked inter-
national condemnation. Pakistan reported
conducting its own nuclear tests less than
three weeks later. As a result of these tests,
President Clinton imposed wide-ranging
sanctions on both countries, as mandated
under the Arms Export Control Act. Many of
these sanctions gradually were lifted through
congressional-executive cooperation from
1998 to 2000. The remaining nuclear sanc-
tions on India (and Pakistan) were removed by
President Bush in September 2001.
The United States also has been con-
cerned with human rights issues related to
regional dissidence and separatist movements
in Kashmir, Punjab, and India’s Northeast
region. Strife in these areas has resulted in the
deaths of tens of thousands of civilians, mili-
tants, and security forces over the two past
decades. Communalism has also been a
matter of concern, with spring 2002 rioting in
the Gujarat state resulting in more than 2,000,
mostly Muslim, deaths. International human
rights groups, as well as Congress and the
U.S. State Department, have criticized India
for perceived human rights abuses in these
regions.
The United States has been supportive of
India’s efforts to transform its formerly
quasi-socialist economy through fiscal reform
and market opening. Beginning in 1991, India
has been taking steps to reduce inflation and
the budget deficit, privatize state-owned
industries, reduce tariffs and industrial licens-
ing controls, and institute incentives to attract
foreign trade and investment. Successive
coalition governments have kept India on a
general path of economic reform and market
opening, though there continues to be U.S.
concern that such movement has been slow
and inconsistent.
The current Bharatiya Janata Party(BJP)-
led coalition government is headed by Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. The coalition
has been in power since October 1999 na-
tional elections decisively ended the historic
dominance of the Nehru-Gandhi-led Congress
Party. The BJP has close ties to Hindu-
nationalist parties and organizations in India.
National elections in 2004 could pit these
increasingly influential groups against those
who wish to retain India’s secular traditions.
See also CRS Report RS21589, India: Chro-
nology of Events, CRS Report RL31644, U.S.-
India Security Relations, and CRS Report




November saw substantive improvement in India-Pakistan relations. An India-Pakistan
peace initiative launched in April made some early progress, and full bilateral diplomatic
relations were restored in July after a 19-month hiatus. During the summer, surging violence
in Kashmir and a war of words between the Indian and Pakistani leaders in September
spurred some analysts to conclude that the peace initiative was moribund. Yet, in October,
New Delhi reinvigorated the process by setting out a 12-point proposal list emphasizing
confidence-building through people-to-people contacts. Islamabad responded positivelyand,
in November, took its own initiatives, most significantly with a November 23 offer of a
cease-fire along the Kashmir Line of Control. By early December, a formal cease-fire
agreement was holding and India and Pakistan agreed to end a two-year suspension of airline
overflight rights in preparation for the scheduled visit of PM Vajpayee to Islamabad for a
summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in January 2004.
On December 1, voters in the key Indian states of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh,
Chattisgarh, and New Delhi went to the polls to choose new state legislatures in what is
viewed to be an important test of BJP and Congress Party strength ahead of national elections
in 2004. Exit polling suggests that the BJP fared better than expected. Election-related
violence left at least five people dead.
On November 14, David Mulford, chairman of Credit Suisse First Boston, former
Treasury Department official (1984-1992), and personal friend of President Bush, was
nominated to be the next U.S. Ambassador to India.
For more information, see CRS Report RS21589, India: Chronology of Events.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Context of the U.S.-India Relationship
In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, India took the
immediate and unprecedented step of offering to the United States full cooperation and the
use of India’s bases for counterterrorism operations. The offer reflected the sea change that
has occurred in recent years in the U.S.-India relationship, which for decades was mired in
the politics of the Cold War. The marked improvement of relations that began in the latter
months of the Clinton Administration was accelerated after a November 2001 meeting
between President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee at the White House, when the
two leaders agreed to greatly expand U.S.-India cooperation on a wide range of issues,
including counterterrorism, regional security, space and scientific collaboration, civilian
nuclear safety, and broadened economic ties. Notable progress has come in the area of
security cooperation, with an increasingly strong focus on counterterrorism, joint military
exercises, and arms sales. In December 2001, the U.S. Defense Policy Group met in New
Delhi for the first time since India’s 1998 nuclear tests and outlined a defense partnership
based on regular and high-level policy dialogue. In July 2002, the fifth and most recent
meeting of the U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism was held in




Population: 1,050 million; growth rate: 1.47% (2003
est.)
Area: 3,287,590 sq. km. (slightly more than one-third
the size of the United States)
Capital: New Delhi
Ethnic Groups: Indo-Aryan 72%; Dravidian 25%;
other 3%
Languages: 15 official, 13 of which are the primary
tongue of at least 10 million people; Hindi is
primary tongue of about 30%; English widely used
Religions: Hindu 81%; Muslim 12%; Christian 2%;
Sikh 2% (2000 est.)
Life Expectancy at Birth: female 64.4 years; male
62.9 years (2003 est.)
Literacy: female 48%; male 70% (2003 est.)
Gross Domestic Product (at PPP): $2.66 trillion; per
capita: $2,540; growth rate 4.3% (2002 est.)
Inflation: 4.3% (2002)
U.S. Trade: exports to U.S. $11.8 billion; imports from
U.S. $4.1 billion (2002)
Sources: CIA World Factbook; U.S. Department of Commerce
U.S. and congressional interests
in India cover a wide spectrum of
issues, ranging from the militarized
dispute with Pakistan and weapons
proliferation to concerns about human
rights and trade and investment
opportunities. In the 1990s, India-
U.S. relations were particularly
affected by the demise of the Soviet
Union — India’s main trading partner
and most reliable source of economic
assistance and military equipment for
most of the Cold War — and New
Delhi’s resulting need to diversify its
international relationships. Also
significant were India’s adoption of
sweeping economic policy reforms
beginning in 1991, a deepening
bitterness between India and Pakistan
over Kashmir, and India’s growing
preoccupation with China as a
potential long-term strategic threat.
With the fading of Cold War constraints, the United States and India began exploring
the possibilities for a more normalized relationship between the world’s two largest
democracies. A visit to the United States by Indian PM Narasimha Rao in 1994 marked the
onset of improved U.S.-India relations. Rao addressed a joint session of Congress and met
with President Clinton. Although discussions were held on nuclear nonproliferation, human
rights, and other issues, the main focus of the visit was rapidly expanding U.S.-India
economic relations. Throughout the 1990s, however, regional rivalries, separatist tendencies,
and sectarian tensions continued to divert India’s attention and resources from economic and
social development. Fallout from these unresolved problems — particularly nuclear
proliferation and human rights issues — presented serious irritants in bilateral relations.
President Clinton’s 2000 visit to South Asia seemed a major U.S. initiative to improve
cooperation with India in the areas of economic ties, regional stability, nuclear proliferation
concerns, security and counterterrorism, environmental protection, clean energy production,
and disease control. President Clinton and Indian PM Vajpayee agreed to institutionalize
dialogue between the two countries through a range of high-level exchanges, and the two
countries established working groups and agreements on numerous issues of mutual concern,
from increasing bilateral trade to combating global warming. President Clinton also lifted
sanctions on some small U.S. assistance programs. During his subsequent visit to the United
States later in 2000, Vajpayee addressed a joint session of Congress and was received for a
state dinner at the White House. In September 2000, President Clinton and PM Vajpayee
signed a joint statement agreeing to cooperate on arms control, terrorism, and AIDS/HIV
(Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, September 25, 2000). During the Bush
Administration, high-level visits have continued: Vajpayee again visited the United States
in November 2001; Home Minister Advani and Defense Minister Fernandes in January
2002; and Foreign Minister Sinha in September 2002. The U.S. Secretaries of State and
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Defense, along with other top U.S. officials, made visits to New Delhi in 2002. Numerous
high-level exchanges have taken place in 2003.
Regional Rivalries
Pakistan. Three wars — in1947-48, 1965, and 1971 — and a constant state of
military preparedness on both sides of the border have marked the half-century of bitter
rivalry between India and Pakistan. The bloody and acrimonious nature of the partition of
British India in 1947, and the continuing dispute over Kashmir remain major sources of
interstate tension and violence. Despite the existence of widespread poverty across South
Asia, both India and Pakistan have built large defense establishments — including nuclear
weapons capability and ballistic missile programs — at the cost of economic and social
development. The nuclear weapons capabilities of the two countries became overt in May
1998, magnifying greatly the potential dangers of a fourth India-Pakistan war.
The Kashmir problem is itself rooted in claims by both countries to the former princely
state, now divided by a military Line of Control (LOC) into the Indian state of Jammu and
Kashmir and Pakistan-controlled Azad (Free) Kashmir. India blames Pakistan for supporting
“cross-border terrorism” and a separatist rebellion in the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley
that has claimed at least 38,000 and perhaps as many as 80,000 lives since 1989. Pakistan
admits only to lending moral and political support to what it calls “freedom fighters”
operating mostly in and near the valley region around the city of Srinagar. Normal relations
between New Delhi and Islamabad were severed in December 2001 after a terrorist attack
on the Indian Parliament was blamed on Pakistan-supported Islamic militants. Other lethal
attacks on Indian civilians have been blamed on Pakistan-sponsored groups, including a May
2002 attack on an army base killed 34, most of them women and children. This event
spurred Indian leaders to call for a “decisive war,” but intense international diplomatic
engagement, including multiple trips to the region by high-level U.S. officials, apparently
persuaded India to refrain from attacking. In October 2002, the two countries ended a tense,
10-month militarystandoff at their shared border, but there has been no high-level diplomatic
dialogue between India and Pakistan since a July 2001 summit meeting in the city of Agra
failed to produce any movement toward a settlement of the bilateral dispute.
In April 2003, the Indian prime minister extended a symbolic “hand of friendship” to
Pakistan. The initiative resulted in slow, but perceptible progress in confidence-building,
and by July full diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored after a 19-
month hiatus. A summer upsurge in separatist violence in Kashmir cast renewed doubts on
regional entente, and caused Vajpayee to again insist that New Delhi will have no direct talks
with Islamabad until violence ends in the disputed region. September 2003 witnessed an
even more marked increase in separatist-related violence, with hundreds of civilians,
militants, and Indian security troops killed in the first two weeks alone. An exchange of
heated rhetoric by the Indian prime minister and the Pakistani president at the U.N. General
Assembly later in the month was the worst in some time, spurring some analysts to conclude
that the latest initiative was moribund. Yet, in October 2003, New Delhi reinvigorated the
process by setting out a 12-point proposal list emphasizing confidence-building through
people-to-people contacts. Islamabad responded positively and, in November, took its own
initiatives, most significantly the offer of a cease-fire along the Kashmir Line of Control. By
early December, a formal cease-fire agreement was holding and India and Pakistan agreed
to end a two-year suspension of airline overflight rights in preparation for the scheduled visit
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of PM Vajpayee to Islamabad for a summit meeting of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation in January 2004.
China. India and China fought a brief but intense border war in 1962 that left China
in control of large swaths of territory still claimed by India. The clash ended a previously
friendly relationship between the two leaders of the nonaligned movement. Although
Sino-Indian relations warmed in recent years, the two countries have yet to reach a final
boundary agreement. During a visit to China by an Indian leader in September 1993, then-
Indian Prime Minister Rao signed an agreement to reduce troops and maintain peace along
the line of actual control (LAC) that divides the two countries’ forces. Periodic working
group meetings aimed at reaching a final settlement continue; 14 have been held to date.
Adding to New Delhi’s sense of insecurity are suspicions regarding China’s long-term
nuclear weapons capabilities and strategic intentions in South and Southeast Asia. In fact,
a strategic orientation focused on China reportedly has affected the course and scope of New
Delhi’s own nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Beijing’s military and
economic support for Pakistan — support that is widely believed to have included WMD-
related transfers — is a major and ongoing source of friction; expressed Chinese support for
Pakistan’s Kashmir position has added to the discomfort of Indian leaders. New Delhi also
has taken note of Beijing’s security relations with neighboring Burma and the construction
of military facilities on the Indian Ocean. Despite these issues, high-level exchanges
between New Delhi and Beijing regularly include statements from officials on both sides that
there exists no fundamental conflict of interest between the two countries, and a June 2003
visit to Beijing by Vajpayee was widely viewed as marking a period of much improved
relations. A modest, but unprecedented November 2003 joint India-China naval exercise off
the coast of Shanghai bolstered the perception of a positive new trajectory for bilateral
relations between the world’s two most populous countries.
Political Setting
National Elections and Prospects for Political Stability. India is widely
considered to have a robust and working democratic system. In 2003, and for the fifth
consecutive year, the nonpartisan Freedom House rated India as “free” in the areas of
political rights and civil liberties (Freedom in the World 2003). The most recent national
elections in October 1999 brought to power a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition
government headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The outcome decisively ended the historic
dominance of the Nehru-Gandhi-led Congress Party, which now sits in opposition at the
national level (though its members lead many state governments). As a nation-state, India
presents a vast mosaic of hundreds of different ethnic groups, religious sects, and social
castes. Until the early 1990s, many of these groups found representation within the diversity
of the Congress Party, which ruled India for 45 of its 56 years since independence. Factors
in the decline of support for the Congress included neglect of its grassroots political
organizations by the leadership, a perceived lack of responsiveness to such major constituent
groups as Muslims and lower castes, the rise of regional and/or issue-based parties, and
allegations of widespread corruption involving party leaders.
December 2002 elections in the state of Gujarat were viewed by many as a key gauge
of continued public support for the BJP. Gujarat was the site of horrific communal conflict
earlier in 2002 when more than 2,000, mostly Muslims, were killed. Gujarat Chief Minister
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and BJP leader Narendra Modi called for early elections — in an effort to take advantage of
the polarized political setting, some say — and ran a campaign that emphasized a perceived
Islamic/Pakistani threat to the country’s and state’s Hindu majority. The BJP party was
rewarded with an unexpectedlydecisive victoryover the rival Congress Party. Some analysts
predicted that the success in Gujarat of a strongly Hindu-nationalist political platform would
be translated into similarly strident campaigns elsewhere in India, along with a more hardline
stance from the BJP-led coalition at the national level.
The next national elections are scheduled to be held some time in 2004, but nine state
elections take place in 2003. State elections in February 2003 included a surprisingly strong
win for the Congress Party in Himachal Pradesh, a populous and overwhelmingly Hindu
northern state where a BJP chief minister was incumbent. This outcome has dampened
expectations that Hindu nationalism will determine the future course of India’s national
politics. Fifteen of India’s 28 states have Congress-led governments. Four of these —
Rajasthan, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Delhi — had elections in December 2003 in
what may be an important preview of national political trends. Early indications are that the
BJP fared better than expected and may call for early national elections.
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Riding a crest of rising Hindu nationalism, the
BJP increased its strength in Parliament from only two seats in 1984 to 119 seats in 1991 to
181 seats at present. In 1992-93, the party’s image was tarnished among some, burnished
for others, by its alleged complicity in serious outbreaks of communal violence in which a
mosque was destroyed at Ayodha and 2,500 people were killed in anti-Muslim rioting in
Bombay and elsewhere. Some observers hold elements of the BJP, as the political arm of
the extremist Hindu nationalist organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS or
National Volunteer Force), responsible for the incidents. Since then, the BJP has worked —
with limited success — to change its image from right-wing Hindu fundamentalist to
conservative, secular, and moderate, although early 2002 riots in Gujarat again damaged the
party’s national and international credentials as a secular and moderate organization.
Following the March 1998 elections, the BJP cobbled together a fragile, 13-member
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition, headed byVajpayee. Vajpayee’s widespread
personal popularityand widespread disenchantment with previous Congress-led governments
has helped to keep the BJP in power. The BJP advocates “Hindutva,” or an India based on
Hindu culture. Although the BJP claims to accept all forms of belief and worship, it views
Hindutva as key to nation-building. Popular among upper caste groups, the party continues
to be looked upon with suspicion by lower caste Indians, India’s 140 million Muslims, and
non-Hindi-speaking Hindus in southern India, who together comprise a majority of India’s
voters. The more controversial long-term goals of the BJP reportedly include building a
Hindu temple on the site of a 16th century mosque in Ayodhya that was destroyed by Hindu
mobs in 1992, establishing a uniform code of law that would abolish special status for
Muslims, and abolishing the special status granted to Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370
of the Indian Constitution. None of these stands were taken in the NDA 1999 election
manifesto as they likely would be opposed by many NDA coalition members. The BJP
leadership has sought to put these goals on the back-burner, but current tensions —
continuing conflict between India and Pakistan and a flare-up of Hindu-Muslim communal
violence in the western state of Gujarat — have put the party in an awkward position.
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The Congress Party. The post-election weakness of the opposition is seen as a
major factor in the BJP coalition government’s continued rule. With just 110 parliamentary
seats, the Congress Party today is at its lowest national representation ever. Observers
attribute the party’s poor showing to a number of factors, including the perception that
current party leader Sonia Gandhi lacked the experience to lead the country, the failure of
Congress to make strong pre-election alliances (as had the BJP), and the splintering of
Congress in Maharashtra state. Support for the Congress Party began to decline following
the 1984 assassination of then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the 1991 assassination of
her son, then-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Sonia Gandhi, Rajiv’s widow, refused to be
drawn into active politics until the 1998 elections. She has since made efforts to revitalize
the organization by phasing out older leaders and attracting more women and lower castes.
In November 1998, signs of a resurgent Congress Party were apparent in a series of state
elections. By landslide margins, the Congress defeated BJP governments in Rajasthan and
Delhi, and maintained its control of Madhya Pradesh. However, the inabilityof the Congress
to form a new government after the fall of the BJP coalition in April 1999, along with
defections led by Maharashtran politicians, weakened the party in the parliamentary
elections. October 2002 elections in Jammu and Kashmir saw the Congress Party
successfully oust the BJP-allied National Conference to form a coalition government with
the regional People’s Democratic Party. December 2002 elections in Gujarat were a major
defeat for Congress and marked a failure of the “soft Hindutva” position taken by Gujarati
party members in an effort to erode BJP support in the state, Congress was again buoyed by
an upset win over BJP incumbents in Himachal Pradesh in February 2003.
India-U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
Security Issues
Dispute Over Kashmir. Although India suffers from several militant regional
separatist movements, the Kashmir dispute has proven the most lethal and intractable. The
problem is rooted in claims by both India and Pakistan to the former princely state, divided
since 1948 by a military Line of Control (LOC) separating the Indian state of Jammu and
Kashmir and Pakistan-controlled Azad (Free) Kashmir. Spurred by what were perceived as
being rigged state elections that unfairly favored pro-New Delhi candidates in 1989, an
ongoing separatist war between Islamic militants and their supporters and Indian security
forces in the Indian-held Kashmir Valley has claimed up to 80,000 lives. India blames
Pakistan for fomenting the rebellion, as well as supplying arms, training, and fighters. It
insists that the dispute should not be “internationalized” through the involvement of third-
party mediators. Pakistan, for its part, claims only to provide diplomatic and moral support
to what it calls “freedom fighters” who resist Indian rule. Islamabad has long sought to bring
external major power persuasion to bear on India, especially from the United States. The
longstanding U.S. position on Kashmir is that the whole of the former princely state is
disputed territory, and that the issue must be resolved through negotiations between India and
Pakistan while taking into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people.
A series of kidnapings and general strikes in the Kashmir Valley, beginning after the
controversial elections of 1989, led India to impose rule by the central government in 1990
and to send in troops to establish order. Many Kashmiris were moved to support newly
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established militant separatist groups after several incidents in which Indian troops fired on
demonstrators. Some groups, such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF),
continue to seek an independent or autonomous Kashmir. Other local groups, including the
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), seek union with Pakistan. In 1993, the All Parties Hurriyat
(Freedom) Conference was formed as an umbrella organization for groups opposed to Indian
rule in Kashmir. The Hurriyat membership of some 23 political and religious groups
includes the JKLF (now a political group) and Jamaat-e-Islami (the political wing of the
HM). The Hurriyat Conference, which states that it is committed to seeking dialogue with
the Indian government on a broad range of issues, seeks a tripartite conference on Kashmir,
including India, Pakistan, and representatives of the Kashmiri people. Hurriyat leaders also
have demanded Kashmiri representation at any talks between India and Pakistan on Kashmir.
In 1995, the government of then-PM Rao began efforts to restart the political process
in Kashmir. May 1996 elections were held to fill Jammu and Kashmir’s six parliamentary
seats. Voter turnout in the state was about 40%, with some reports of voters being herded
to polling stations by security forces. The elections served as a rehearsal for state assembly
elections, which were held in September 1996. The National Conference (NC), the
longstanding establishment Kashmiri party led by Farooq Abdullah, won 57 of 87 seats, and
Abdullah became chief minister of the state. In April 1998, Jammu and Kashmir again took
part in national parliamentary elections. Pre-election violence and a boycott by the Hurriyat
kept voter turnout in the state at an estimated 35%-40%. Voter turnout in the state declined
even further in 1999 parliamentary elections.
In 2001 and 2002, a series of violent incidents worsened the region’s security climate
and brought India and Pakistan to the brink of full-scale war. In October 2001, Islamic
militants attacked the state assembly building in Srinagar, killing 38, and a brazen December
attack on the Indian Parliament complex in New Delhi left 14 dead. Indian government
officials blamed Pakistan-based militant groups for both attacks and initiated a massive
military mobilization that brought hundreds of thousands of Indian troops to the border with
Pakistan. In May 2002, in the midst of this armed showdown, militants attacked an Indian
army base in the Jammu town of Kaluchak, leaving 34 dead, many of them women and
children. New Delhi leveled accusations that Islamabad was sponsoring Kashmiri terrorism;
Indian leaders talked of making “pre-emptive” military incursions against separatists’
training bases on Pakistani territory. The situation was further exacerbated with the
assassinations of two moderate Kashmiri separatist leaders in late-2002 and early-2003. (For
a review, see CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists.)
International pressure included numerous visits to the region by top U.S. diplomats and
led Pakistani President Musharraf to publically state that no infiltration was taking place at
the LOC. On receiving assurances from Secretary of State Powell and others that Pakistan
would terminate support for infiltration and dismantle militant training camps, India began
the slow process of reducing tensions with Pakistan. In October 2002, after completion of
state elections in Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi announced that a months-long process of
redeploying troops to their peacetime barracks had begun. Islamabad responded with a
stand-down order of its own, although the Indian and Pakistani armies continue to exchange
sporadic small arms, mortar, and even artillery fire along the LOC.
Indian Kashmir remains volatile. October 2002 elections to the state assembly resulted
in the ouster of the National Conference and the establishment of a coalition government of
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the Congress Party and the People’s Democratic Party. While the seating of this new and
seemingly more moderate state government renewed hopes for peace in the troubled region,
continued separatist violence dampened early optimism. The United States welcomed the
election process as a necessary first step toward the initiation of a meaningful dialogue
between India and Pakistan to peacefully resolve their dispute. Secretary of State Powell
asserted that, “The problems with Kashmir cannot be resolved through violence, but only
through a healthy political process and a vibrant dialogue” (see CRS Report RS21300,
Elections in Kashmir).
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation. Policy analysts consider the
apparent arms race between India and Pakistan as posing perhaps the most likely prospect
for the future use of nuclear weapons. In May 1998, India conducted five underground
nuclear tests, breaking a 24-year, self-imposed moratorium on such testing. Despite
international efforts to dissuade it, Pakistan quickly followed. The tests created a global
storm of criticism, and represented a serious setback for two decades of U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. Following the tests, President Clinton imposed full
restrictions on non-humanitarian aid to both India and Pakistan as mandated under Section
102 of the Arms Export Control Act. Almost immediately, Congress acted to ease
restrictions in some areas. In September 2001, President Bush waived remaining sanctions
on India pursuant to P.L. 106-79.
Proliferation in South Asia may be part of a chain of rivalries — India seeking to
achieve deterrence against China, and Pakistan seeking to gain an “equalizer” against a
conventionally stronger India. India currently is believed to have enough fissile material for
75-100 nuclear weapons; Pakistan is thought to have approximately half that number. Both
countries have aircraft capable of delivering nuclear bombs. India’s military has inducted
short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, while Pakistan itself possesses short- and
medium-range missiles (allegedly acquired from China and North Korea). All are assumed
to be capable of delivering small nuclear warheads over significant distances.
In August 1999, a quasi-governmental Indian body released a Draft Nuclear Doctrine
for India calling for a “minimum credible deterrent” (MCD) based upon a triad of delivery
systems and pledging that India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.
(Islamabad has made no comparable public declaration, but it also seeks to maintain an MCD
while rejecting a no-first-use pledge.) In January 2003, New Delhi announced creation of
a Nuclear Command Authority. After the body’s first session in September 2003,
participants vowed to “consolidate India’s nuclear deterrent” and review the readiness of its
strategic forces. As such, India appears to be taking the next step toward operationalizing
its nuclear weapons capability. (Pakistan created its own National Command Authority for
its nuclear forces in 2000.) (See also CRS Reports RL32115, Missile Proliferation and the
Strategic Balance in South Asia, and RS21237, India and Pakistan Nuclear Weapons Status.)
U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts. During the 1990s, the United States security focus
in South Asia sought to minimize damage to the nonproliferation regime, prevent escalation
of an arms and/or missile race, and promote Indo-Pakistani bilateral dialogue. In light of
these goals, the Clinton Administration set forward five key “benchmarks” for India and
Pakistan based on the contents of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1172 (June 1998) which
condemned the two countries’ nuclear tests. These were: 1) signing and ratifying the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); 2) halting all further production of fissile
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material and participating in Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations; 3) limiting
development and deployment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery vehicles; 4)
implementing strict export controls on sensitive WMD materials and technologies; and 5)
establishing bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan to resolve their mutual differences.
Progress in each of these areas has been limited, and the Bush Administration makes
no reference to the benchmark framework. Neither India nor Pakistan has signed the CTBT,
and both appear to be continuing their production of weapons-grade fissile materials. (India
has consistently rejected this treaty, as well as the NPT, as discriminatory, calling instead for
a global nuclear disarmament regime. Although both India and Pakistan currently observe
self-imposed moratoria on nuclear testing, they continue to resist signing the CTBT — a
position made more tenable by U.S. Senate’s rejection of the treaty in 1999.) The status of
weaponization and deployment is unclear, though there are indications that this is occurring
at a slow, but more or less steady pace. Aside from security concerns, the governments of
both countries are faced with the prestige factor attached to their nuclear programs and the
domestic unpopularity of relinquishing what are perceived to be potent symbols of national
power. Early optimism in the area of export controls has waned somewhat as fears that these
countries, especiallyPakistan, might seek to export WMD materials and/or technologies have
gained some credence. Finally, although there has been no repeat of the intense military
clashes of May-June 1999, and a ten-month-long military standoff in 2002 ended without
war, tensions in Kashmir remain high, and bilateral dialogue is not occurring. Some
observers have lately called for a new U.S. approach that would provide technical assistance
in enhancing the security of any WMD materials in South Asia (see CRS Report RL31589,
Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan).
Congressional Action. Through a series of legislative measures, Congress has lifted
nuclear-related sanctions both on India and Pakistan.* Section 1601 of P.L.107-228 outlines
nonproliferation objectives for South Asia with respect to nuclear testing, nuclear weapons
and ballistic missile deployments and developments, export controls and confidence-building
measures. Among the numerous concerns voiced by some Members of Congress in March
2003 was that there continue to be “contradictions” in U.S. nonproliferation policy toward
South Asia, particularly as related to the U.S. Senate’s 1999 rejection of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty and indications that the Defense Department may continue to develop low-
yield nuclear weapons (Federal News Service, March 20, 2003).
U.S.-India Security Cooperation. Unlike U.S.-Pakistan military ties, which date
back to the 1950s, security cooperation between the United States and India is in the early
stages of development. Since September 2001, and despite a concurrent U.S. rapprochement
with Pakistan, India-U.S. security cooperation has flourished. Both countries acknowledge
a desire for greater bilateral security cooperation and a series of measures have been taken
to achieve this. Joint Steering Groups between the U.S. and Indian armed services hold
regular meetings. The India-U.S. Defense Policy Group (DPG) — moribund since India’s
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1998 nuclear tests and ensuing U.S. sanctions — was revived in late 2001. An August
session of the DPG reviewed accomplishments since the previous such meeting in May 2002
and set plans for a missile defense workshop in India, among other activities (Agence France-
Presse, August 8, 2003). Some analysts have lauded increased U.S.-India security ties as
providing potential counterbalance to growing Chinese influence in the region.
During 2002 and continuing into 2003, the United States and India held numerous joint
exercises involving all militarybranches. Unprecedented advanced air combat exercises took
place in June 2003 and provided the U.S. military with its first look at the Russian-built Su-
30MKI, among the most capable fighter aircraft in its class. In September, U.S. and Indian
special forces soldiers held a two-week joint exercise in Ladakh near the India-China border,
and the largest-ever “Malabar 2003” joint naval exercises off the southern coast of India
included an American nuclear submarine. Despite these developments, there remain
indications that the perceptions and expectations of top U.S. and Indian military leaders are
divergent on several key issues, including India’s role in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia,
approaches to countering terrorism, and a potential U.S. role in resolving the India-Pakistan
dispute. Moreover, the existence of a nonproliferation constituency in the United States is
seen as a further hindrance to more fully developed military-to-military relations.
Along with increasingly visible military-to-military ties, the issue of U.S. arms sales to
India has taken a higher profile. In February 2002, Congress was notified of the negotiated
sale to India of 8 counter-battery radar sets (or “Firefinder” radars) valued at more than $100
million (the following September, arrangements were made for the sale of four additional
sets). Two of these were delivered in July 2003. The State Department has authorized Israel
to sell to India the jointly developed U.S.-Israeli Phalcon airborne early warning system, a
$1 billion-plus asset that some analysts believe may tilt the regional strategic balance even
further in India’s favor. The Indian government reportedly possesses an extensive list of
desired U.S.-made weapons, including P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, Patriot (PAC-3)
anti-missile systems, and electronic warfare systems. The United States appears prepared
to provide Indian security forces with sophisticated electronic ground sensors that may help
stem the tide of militant infiltration in the Kashmir region. Still, some in India consider the
United States to be a “fickle” partner that may not always be relied upon to provide the kinds
of reciprocity, sensitivity, and high-technology transfers sought by New Delhi.
In a controversial turn, the Indian government has sought to purchase a sophisticated
anti-missile platform — the Arrow Weapon System — from Israel. However, because the
United States took the lead in the system’s development, the U.S. government has veto
power over any Israeli exports of the Arrow. Although numerous U.S. Defense Department
officials are seen to support the sale as meshing with President Bush’s policy of cooperating
with friendlycountries on missile defense, State Department officials are reported to opposed
the transfer, believing that it would send the wrong signal to other weapons-exporting states
at a time when the U.S. is seeking to discourage international weapons proliferation.
September 2003 press reports indicate that the U.S. interest in maintaining a strategic balance
on the subcontinent may preclude any approval of the Arrow sale for many years (Agence
France-Presse, September 9, 2003).
Joint U.S.-India military exercises, arms sales negotiations, and a new allocation of $5
million in U.S. Foreign Military Financing for India have caused disquiet in Pakistan, where
there is concern that the developments will strengthen India’s position through an appearance
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that Washington is siding with India. Islamabad is concerned that its already
disadvantageous conventional military status vis-a-vis New Delhi will be further eroded by
India’s acquisition of additional modern weapons platforms such as the Phalcon and Arrow.
In fact, numerous observers have noted what appears to be a pro-India drift in the U.S.
government’s strategic orientation in South Asia. Yet the United States regularly lauds
Pakistan’s role as a key ally in the U.S.-led counterterrorism coalition and seeks to assure
Islamabad that it will take no actions that disrupt strategic balance on the subcontinent. (For
further discussion, see CRS Report RL31644, U.S.-India Security Relations.)
Regional Dissidence and Human Rights
A vastly diverse country in terms of ethnicity, language, culture, and religion, India can
be difficult to govern. Internal instability resulting from diversity is further complicated by
colonial legacies — for example, international borders separate members of the same ethnic
groups, creating flashpoints for regional dissidence and separatism. Kashmir and Assam are
two regions that continue to suffer from violent separatist campaigns; Punjab saw significant
struggle in the 1980s. The remote and underdeveloped northeast of India is populated by a
complex mosaic of ethnic and religious groups, both tribal and non-tribal. Migration of non-
tribal peoples into less populated tribal areas is at the root of many problems in that region.
India-Bangladesh relations have been disrupted in recent months byNew Delhi’s accusations
that Dhaka is taking insufficient action against Pakistan-supported separatist militants who
find sanctuary on Bangladeshi territory.
Gujarat. Gujarat is a relatively prosperous state in western India on the Arabian Sea.
In February 2002, a group of Hindu activists returning by train from the city of Ayodha —
the site of the razed 16th century Babri Mosque and a proposed Hindu temple — were
attacked by a Muslim mob in the town of Godhra, Gujarat, and 58 people were killed. In the
communal rioting that followed, some 2,000 people were killed, most of them Muslim.
Many observers criticized the BJP-led state and national governments for inaction; some
even saw evidence of state government complicity in anti-Muslim attacks. Leading human
rights groups have been harshly critical of the central government’s alleged inaction in
bringing those responsible to justice. The government’s inability to successfully quell
violence in Gujarat led to rifts within India’s BJP-led National Democratic Alliance, with
some secular coalition members condemning the BJP role. However, in December 2002, in
what many analysts saw as a vindication of the BJP government in Gujarat and its Hindu-
nationalist tack, state elections there resulted in a decisive BJP victory. Yet some of the
criticisms leveled by rights groups were echoed by the Indian Supreme Court in September
2003, when justices strongly admonished Gujarati authorities for their mishandling of
attempts to prosecute some of those charged with riot-related crimes (BBC News, September
12, 2003). In June 2003, a court acquitted 21 Hindus accused of burning alive 12 Muslims
at the Best Bakery; authorities have since agreed to seek a retrial.
The Northeast. The Kashmir region is home to India’s most widely known separatist
movement, but other significant and lethal internal conflicts are ongoing. Since the time of
India’s foundation, numerous separatist groups have fought for ethnic autonomy or
independence in the country’s northeast region; some of the tribal struggles are centuries old.
It is estimated that more than 25,000 people have been killed in such fighting since 1948.
The United Liberation Front of Asom, the National Liberation Front of Tripura, the National
Democratic Front of Bodoland, and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland are among
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the groups at war with the New Delhi government (though the decades-old Naga campaign
may be ending). In addition, the Maoist People’s War Group is continuing to wreak havoc
in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh. Indian government officials have at times blamed
Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal, and Bhutan for “sheltering” one or more of these groups beyond
the reach of Indian security forces, and accuse Pakistan’s intelligence agency of training and
providing them with material support.
Human Rights. According to the U.S. State Department’s India Country Report on
Human Rights Practices for 2002 (issued March 2003), the Indian government “generally
respected the human rights of its citizens; however, numerous serious problems remained.”
These included extensive societal violence against women; extrajudicial killings, including
faked encounter killings; excessive use of force by security forces, arbitrary arrests, and
incommunicado detentions in Kashmir and several northeastern states; torture and rape by
agents of the government; poor prison conditions and lengthy pretrial detentions without
charge; forced prostitution; child prostitution and female infanticide; human trafficking; and
caste-based discrimination and violence, among others. Terrorist attacks and kidnapings also
remained grievous problems, especially in Kashmir and the northeastern states.
In its report, the U.S. State Department notes that, “Many of these abuses are generated
by a traditionally hierarchical social structure, deeply rooted tensions among the country’s
many ethnic and religious communities, violent secessionist movements and the authorities’
attempts to repress them, and deficient police methods and training.” Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, and other human rights groups have been harshly critical of India’s
human rights record on these issues, especially with regard to sectarian violence in Gujarat
in the spring of 2002. Also, the March 2002 enactment of a new Prevention of Terrorism Act
(POTA) has come under fire as providing the government a powerful tool with which to
arbitrarily target minorities and political opponents. In one example, in February 2003, the
Gujarat government charged 131 Muslims under POTA for allegedly attacking Hindus in
Godhra one year earlier. Although ensuing rioting caused up to 2,000 Muslim deaths, the
Hindu-nationalist BJP that heads the state government has not charged any Hindus under
POTA for violence against Muslims. Elsewhere, a reported 5,000 Kashmiris currently are
in jail under anti-terrorist laws. In general, India has denied international human rights
groups official access to Kashmir, Punjab, and other sensitive areas.
A secular nation, India has a long tradition of religious tolerance (with occasional
lapses), which is protected under its constitution. India’s population includes a Hindu
majority of 82% as well as a large Muslim minority of more than 130 million (14%).
Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and others each total less than 4%. Although freedom
of religion is protected by the Indian government, human rights groups have noted that
India’s religious tolerance is susceptible to attack by religious extremists. In its annual report
released in May 2003, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom expressed
“deep disappointment” at Secretary of State Powell’s decision omit India from the “countries
of particular concern.”
India’s Economy and U.S. Concerns
Overview. Despite the existence of widespread and serious poverty, many observers
believe that India’s long-term economic potential is tremendous, and recent strides in the
technologysector have brought international attention to such high-tech centers as Bangalore
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and Hyderabad. Yet analysts — along with some U.S. government officials — point to
excessive regulatory and bureaucratic structures as a hindrance to the realization of India’s
full economic potential. The high cost of capital (rooted in large government budget deficits)
and an “abysmal” infrastructure also draw negative appraisals as obstacles to growth.
Constant comparisons with the progress of the Chinese economy show India lagging in rates
of growth and foreign investment, and in the removal of trade barriers.
After enjoying an average growth rate above 6% for the 1990s, the Indian economy
cooled somewhat with the global economic downturn after 2000. For FY2002 (ending in
March 2003), real change in GDP was 4.3%. Robust growth in services and industry was
countered by a drought-induced contraction of the agricultural sector. Analysts concluded
that New Delhi’s target of 8% growth for FY2003 was overly optimistic; the Indian
government apparently agreed, lowering its projection to 6%. Most independent observers
see this as more realistic or perhaps even low, with strong monsoon rains driving recovery
in the agricultural sector. Longer-term estimates are equallyencouraging, predicting FY2004
growth well above 6% and FY2005 growth of around 7%. A major upswing in the services
sector is expected to lead; this sector now accounts for more than half of India’s gross
domestic product. Inflation rates have been fairly low (4.4% for 2002), but have been pushed
above 5% in 2003 due to higher fuel prices and increased industrial output. In early October,
the benchmark Sensex stock index rose above the 4,500 mark and the rupee appreciated to
a more than three-year high against the U.S. dollar, adding to economic optimism. As of late
November 2003, the benchmark Bombay Stock Exchange had gained 48% since the
beginning of the year. India’s foreign exchange reserves have grown immensely since 2001,
doubling to more than $90 billion in 2003 and expected to exceed $100 billion in 2004.
A major U.S. concern with regard to India is the scope and pace of reforms in what has
been that country’s quasi-socialist economy. Economic reforms begun in 1991, under the
Congress-led government of then-Prime Minister Rao, boosted economic growth and led to
huge foreign investment to India in the mid-1990s. (Annual foreign direct investment (FDI)
rose from about $100 million in 1990 to $2.4 billion by 1996. Net FDI in 2002 was an
estimated $5.2 billion, with projections for 2003 topping $7 billion. More than one-third of
these investments was made by U.S. companies.) Reform efforts stagnated, however, under
the weak coalition governments of the mid-1990s. The Asian financial crisis and sanctions
on India (as a result of its May 1998 nuclear tests) further dampened the economic outlook.
Following the 1999 parliamentaryelection, the Vajpayee government launched second-
generation economic reforms, including major deregulation, privatization, and tariff-reducing
measures. Once seen as favoring domestic business and diffident about foreign involvement,
the government appears to gradually be embracing globalization and has sought to reassure
foreign investors with promises of transparent and nondiscriminatory policies. Most
recently, the debate over privatization focuses on the proposed sale of India’s two large state-
owned oil companies, a sale supported by the BJP but opposed by other politically powerful
groups. However, the budget unveiled by Indian Finance Minister Singh in February 2003
was criticized by analysts as doing too little to curb India’s growing fiscal deficit or to raise
the country’s low tax revenues. In July 2003, the head of research for the International
Monetary Fund warned that India’s high and growing public debt ratio could reduce the
country’s annual economic growth rate to below 5%, and a report of the World Bank lauded
India’s progress in increasing incomes and living standards, but warned that the trend cannot
be sustained unless there are further reforms.
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Trade. As India’s largest trading and investment partner, the United States strongly
supports New Delhi’s continuing economic reform policies. U.S. exports to India in 2002
were valued at $4.1 billion, while imports from India in that year totaled about $11.8 billion.
Despite significant tariff reductions and other measures taken by India to improve market
access, according to the report of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) for 2002,
a number of foreign trade barriers remain and, in November 2002, then-U.S. Treasury
Secretary O’Neill noted that India’s average tariff rates are among the highest in Asia. U.S.
exports that reportedly would benefit from lower Indian tariffs include fertilizers, wood
products, computers, medical equipment, scrap metals, and agricultural products.
India’s extensive array of trade and investment barriers has been criticized by U.S.
government officials and business leaders as an impediment to its own economic
development, as well as to stronger U.S.-India ties. For example, the Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative asserted in February 2003 that progress in transforming the U.S.-Indian
economic relationship has been “slow.” Among the reasons for a lack of progress, he
identified India’s “grudging attitude” toward imports that produces “multiple, onion-like
barriers” to potential exporters. He also noted that “India’s tariff and tax structure
undermines its commitments in the WTO,” and that India’s high agricultural support prices
have encouraged overproduction in that sector (“Remarks byAmb. Jon Huntsman,” February
5, 2003). In November 2003, U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce Juster lauded significant
increases in bilateral trade with India, while also asserting that – from the U.S. perspective
– India’s tariffs and taxes remain too high, its investment caps too restrictive, its customs
procedures too complex, and its intellectual property rights protections less than full (“U.S.-
India Relations and High-Technology Trade,” November 20, 2003).
Inadequate intellectual property rights protection, by means of patents, trademarks and
copyrights, has been a long-standing issue between the United States and India. In a
November 2002 speech in Mumbai, U.S. Under Secretary of State Larson made an explicit
link between the improvement of India’s intellectual property rights protections and India’s
further economic growth. Major areas of irritation have included pirating of U.S.
pharmaceuticals, books, tapes, and videos. The International Intellectual Property Alliance
estimates U.S. losses of more than $468 million due to trade piracy in 2002. U.S. motion
picture industry representatives estimated their annual losses due to audiovisual piracyat $66
million. In May 2003, the USTR again named India to the Special 301 Priority Watch List
for its “weak” protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. The Heritage
Foundation’s 2003 Index of Economic Freedom rated India as being “mostly unfree,”
highlighting an especially restrictive set of trade policies, large fiscal burdens imposed by
government, heavy government involvement in the finance sector, demanding regulatory
structures, and a high level of black market activity. (For further discussion, see CRS Report
RS21502, India-U.S. Economic Relations.)
“Trinity” Issues
Since 2001, the Indian government has pressed the United States to ease restrictions on
the export to India of dual-use high-technology goods, as well as to increase civilian nuclear
and space cooperation. These three key issues have come to be known as “The Trinity,” and
top Indian officials have stated that progress in these areas is necessary to “provide tangible
evidence of a changed [U.S.-India] relationship.” (There also are references to a “quartet”
when the issue of missile defense is included.) In October 2003, Secretary of State Powell
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asserted that progress is being made on the “glide path” toward agreement on the “Trinity”
issues (U.S. Department of State Washington File, October 3, 2003). Some Members of
Congress have expressed concern that dual-use technology trade with India might allow that
country to advance its military nuclear projects, but the Commerce Department has stated
that future civil nuclear and civil space cooperation with India will take place only “within
the limitations of our commitments under multilateral nonproliferation regimes” (Under
Secretary Juster, “Letter to The Honorable Edward Markey,” February 14, 2003).
In June 2003, Under Secretary of Commerce Juster, who has taken the lead in U.S.-
India trade negotiations, sought to dispel “trade-deterring myths” by noting that only about
1% of total U.S. trade with India in FY2002 was subject to licensing requirements, and that
less than half of that amount involved license denials. On July 1, 2003, some 150
representatives of private industries in both countries met in Washington to share their
interests and concerns with governmental leaders. Panel topics included investment,
information technology, defense trade, life sciences, and nanotechnology. The next day saw
the inaugural session of the U.S.-India High-TechnologyCooperation Group (HTCG), where
officials discussed a wide range of issues relevant to creating the conditions for more robust
bilateral high technology commerce, including market access, tariff and non-tariff barriers,
strategic trade, and export controls.
In February 2003, the Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
visited India for the first time since before the 1998 nuclear tests. Dr. Meserve reportedly
discussed issues of safety and emergency operating procedures for India’s civilian nuclear
program. In July, the Indian government reportedly confirmed that bilateral dialogue is
underway to expand space and civilian nuclear cooperation with the United States. New
Delhi has not requested U.S. assistance in building new nuclear power plants, but several
safety-related initiatives are said to be underway (in September, the NRC met with an Indian
delegation in Washington to exchange safety information). Cooperative efforts in space
technology reportedly include applications for sustainable development, weather research,
tele-medicine, tele-education, and disaster management.
U.S. Assistance
The United States is the third largest bilateral aid donor to India, after Japan and Britain.
Actual U.S. assistance to India in FY2002 totaled nearly $80 million (and an additional
$105.7 million in food grants). The Bush Administration’s request for FY2003 would have
increased this amount to $107 million (plus $91.3 million in food aid), with the most notable
boosts coming through Economic Support Funds (ESF) (from $7 million to $25 million) and
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) (from zero to $5 million). However, in P.L. 108-7,
Congress allocated $10.5 million in ESF, bringing the actual FY2003 assistance total to
$92.7 million. The Administration’s FY2004 request currently stands at about $95 million,
plus another $45 million in food assistance (see Table 1, below).
Economic. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development, India has
more people living in abject poverty — upwards of 300 million — than do Latin America
and Africa combined. From 1947 through 2001, the United States provided nearly $14
billion in economic loans and grants to India. The main focus of USAID programs in India
— currently averaging about $85 million per year — is improving the quality of and access
to reproductive health services; providing supplementary food and health services to the
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poor; fostering energy efficiency; improving environmental conditions in urban areas;
reducing transmission of infectious diseases; expanding service delivery networks for
women; improving capacity of financial markets and government to accelerate economic
growth; and reducing suffering associated with natural disasters and establishing conditions
for rehabilitation.
Security. From 1947 through 2001, the United States provided $153 million in
military assistance to India (94% of this amount was distributed from 1962-1966). By way
of comparison, neighboring rival Pakistan received more than $3 billion in U.S. military
assistance during the same period. Security-related assistance allocated for India in FY2003
was $7 million, including a new $5 million FMF program to “further promote cooperation
and interoperability by encouraging Indian use of U.S. equipment.” Another $5 million in
FY2004 FMF would include high-tech surveillance and training equipment, ground sensors
for use along the Kashmiri Line of Control, nuclear/biological/chemical decontamination
equipment, and naval radars. The United States also provides funds for counter-narcotics,
export controls, and military training.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to India, FY2001-FY2004
(in millions of U.S. dollars)







CSH 24.6 41.7 40.8 40.8
DA 28.8 29.2 34.4 27.1
ESF 5.0 7.0 10.5 20.0
FMF -.- -.- 5.0 5.0
IMET 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.3
NADR-EXBS 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0
Subtotal $59.8 $79.8 $92.7 $95.2
P.L.480 Title II* 78.3 93.7 91.3 45.0
Section 416(b)* -.- 12.0 -.- -.-
Total $138.1 $185.5 $184.0 $140.2
Sources: U.S. Departments of State and Agriculture; U.S. Agency for International Development.
Abbreviations:
CSH: Child Survival and Health
DA: Development Assistance
ESF: Economic Support Fund
FMF: Foreign Military Financing
IMET: International Military Education and Training
NADR-EXBS: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related - Export Control and Related
Border Security Assistance
P.L.480 Title II: Emergency and Private Assistance food aid (grants)
Section 416(b): The Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations)
*Food aid amounts do not include what can be significant transportation costs.
